Israel and Palestine at a High Level

It would seem we need to have a discussion around the Israeli Palestinian conflict raging in the Middle East. It perplexes me how poorly informed some are on the issue, yet claim to be on top of everything. One girl for example has graced my social media feed with some very misinformed opinions. This issue is not an easy one to dive into. The complexities and intricacies are extremely deep with numerous layers of complications. I took a course in college that focused solely on the issue of Israel and Palestine, and I re-read my final paper, and decided its worth sharing - it did get an A, which shouldn't surprise you. I will preface this paper by saying that the professor was very poor at explaining the issue - he was a nice guy, but his laziness in the classroom coupled with his poor control led to a terrible learning environment that I think misinformed many of the students at the time as to how complex this problem really is. I obviously am no expert on the issue myself, but I do have an understanding as to some of the historical components in addition to an apprehension beyond what the main stream media articulates.

Before we dive into the paper, I need to articulate that in the context of this issue today, we are unable to make progress due to the fact that Hamas - a terrorist organization - has power in Palestine. These are people who utilize suicide bombers and young children to terrorize Israel. They hide amongst civilians, intermingling, so that if Israel is to respond to attacks, they have a high probability of killing innocent people. When Trump was in office he froze around $250 million in foreign aid to Palestine, and we had peace. Once Biden came in and freed up that money, Hamas purchased weapons in the form of rockets from Iran - the largest state sponsor of terrorism, who acts as one of the most destabilizing forces in the region. The last week or so has born witness to these rockets being launched into Israel, to which they have a defense system called the "Iron Dome," which intercepts missile's launched into the country. In terms of retaliation, Israeli has responded by attacking Hamas, taking very stringent care to not kill civilians. For example, they just bombed a high rise that housed Hamas operations. Also working in that building were many civilian organizations like the Associated Press (The AP) and Al Jazeera. Israel gave a heads up that they would be attacking that building, and gave civilians ample time to leave the area before leveling the site.

Historically, Israel and Palestine have taken very hard lined stances against each other, and both sides were not prone to negotiating in good faith. In recent years, Israel has begin to negotiate in good faith, which can be evidenced by the progress made in the Abraham Accords - a peace treaty organized by the Trump Administration between some Arab nations and Israel. Despite the current predicament, that treaty as of this writing has held up.

Some have said peace and a solution in the region is impossible. I refuse to accept such a notion - peace is always an option. John F. Kennedy once said,

"...Every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward, by examining his own attitude towards the possibilities of peace...First, examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it is unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable, that mankind is doomed, that we are gripped by forces we cannot control. We need not accept that view. Our problems are manmade. Therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man’s reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable and we believe they can do it again."

To move forward, Hamas and terrorism must be rooted out from the region. Good people must be installed into power, and then both sides must negotiate in good faith. Sounds simple doesn't it?

My paper

A) Identifications

1) Oslo Accords

The Oslo Accords were signed in 1993 at the White House under President Bill Clinton. Modeled on the Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Self-Rule (DOP), the agreement was built around a lengthy two stage timetable. Both Israel and Palestine agreed to have mutual recognition of each other. In return both sides made significant commitments. The PLO accepted Israel’s demand for peace and security, while Israel conceded that the PLO was the main representative for the Palestinian people. The first part of the Oslo Accords was not intended to go beyond five years, and allowed for the election of a new Palestinian Authority with a headquarters to begin self-governance. Major problems were set aside and deemed “final status issues.” The purpose of the Oslo Accords was not to reach a final agreement based on Resolution 242, but to rather set the stage in the long term with the premise that time could heal certain wounds until the appropriate people were in place to negotiate the right deal. Ultimately the Oslo Accords fell apart during the Second Intifada.

2) PLO

The Palestinian Liberation Organization was established in 1964 and would be recognized in 1974 by at the Arab summit as the “sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” One of the main goals of the PLO was the destruction of Israel. Yasser Arafat took power as the executive Chairman in 1969 and remained in his post through 2004, when he passed away. Arafat gained international attention and would become the first non-government representative to address the United Nation’s General Assembly. The PLO was notoriously recognized as using terrorism and violence against Israeli’s to advance their mission of destroying Israel and reclaiming what they deemed Palestine. The PLO is composed of five main bodies. The Palestine National Council acts as a parliamentary body, while the Central Council operates as a mediatory body between the PNC and Executive Committee, which includes the chairmen and members appointed by the PNC. In addition, the body has a Palestinian National Fund, which operates like a treasury department, and the Palestinian Liberation Army, which is the official military command post for Palestine. The PLO headed by Arafat, was instrumental in negotiating the Oslo Accords.

3) Hamas

Hamas is the most commonly associated terrorist group of Palestine, operating under the guise of a politically motivated group. Their origins trace back to 1987 during the First Intifada, taking their roots from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The group regularly engages in terrorism, utilizing suicide bombers as a means to attack Israeli’s. The ultimate goal of Hamas is to demolish Israel and construct an Islamic state in its place. Hamas did not agree with the Oslo Accords and acted in a manner than would contribute to the demise of any negotiations. To the shock of the world Hamas won in the 2006 Palestinian election, which has caused political turbulence within the state and provoked the chairman at the time Mahmoud Abbas to set up an emergency cabinet and rule separately in the West Bank, while Hamas controls Gaza.

4) Gush Emunim

Gush Emunim, meaning Bloc of the Faithful, was a movement established in 1974, yet takes its roots from Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and his son Rabbi Tzvi Yehudah Kook. The religious undertaking of the movement interprets redemption as a slow process that occurs over a period of centuries. After the election in 1977 of the Likud party, the movement and its objectives were supported. The heart of the movement lies in the belief that the Messiah will eventually come, but every inch of Israel must be inhabited by Jews as outlined in the Bible. As a result of the Gush Emunim movement, Israeli settlements in 1974 were expanded in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, culminating in roughly 250,000 Israeli’s settling in the West Bank.

5) Second Intifada

The Second Intifada, also known as the al-Aqsa intifada, occurred in 2000. Anger had been building amongst younger Palestinians concerning the failure of the Oslo Accords to eradicate Israeli occupation and the humiliation it wrought. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would visit the Temple Mount in 2000, to claim that all Jews had a right to visit the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa mosque, which used to be to the Jewish Temple Mount – the first and second Temples that were ultimately destroyed. The event provoked Palestinian riots the next day, resulting in 18 Palestinian deaths. By the turn of 2003, 2,400 Palestinians and 800 Israeli’s had died, while more were wounded. The Intifada ended in 2004, but wreaked turmoil politically in the region, especially decreasing the Fatah’s control of the PLO and allowing for Hamas to gain more power.

B) Paper Summary

Module 6: Bunton, Chapter 6: The Rise and the Fall of the Peace Process, 1987-2007

In his book The Palestinian Israeli Conflict, Martin Bunton articulates the complexity of attaining a two state solution in chapter 6, titled “The rise and fall of the peace process 1987-2007.” The Israeli Palestinian conflict is a deeply layered issue that has gripped the Middle East for decades and groped international powers into mediating hopeful peace talks that have cascaded into failure and more hostility. Bunton argues the two intifadas, “fundamentally transformed political equations on the ground,” and revealed Palestinian resentment towards Israeli inhabitation as well as the magnitude of Palestinian nationalism. He argues how the Oslo accords set the stage for a potential peace agreement, but the lengthy duration offset the process and resulted in the resurgence of violence executed by Hamas through suicide bombings and Israeli’s security response.

The Oslo agreement dates back to a meeting that took place in 1979 at Camp David, deriving its substance from what was known as the Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Self-Rule (DOP). The Oslo agreement required both parties to recognize each other, while the PLO denounced violence on Israel and acknowledged their right to “peace and security,” while Israel validated the PLO as the main representative for all of Palestine. The overall process was phased into two parts and designed to take many years. Major key issues were put aside on the “back burner,” officially titled, “final status issues.” The idea behind the Oslo process was to construct a political framework over a long duration of time that would lead to a final and lasting solution, however just the opposite occurred and both sides ended more vexed and angry with each other by the end as can be seen through multiple examples Bunton lays out.

Bunton first identifies how Hamas deeply believed in the failure of the Oslo accords. As a group they did not want to see a compromise between Israel and Palestine. Hamas rejected historic Palestine and believed in Mandate Palestine and the construction of an Islamic state and the demolition of Israel. They rejected the idea of compromise initiated by the PLO. As a result, in 1994, Hamas began orchestrating suicide bombings in Israel. Shortly after, the Prime Minister of Israel was assassinated and Benjamin Netanyahu – leader of the Likud Party – took office in 1996 replacing Rabin. His platform enforced Israeli security, and tensions only worsened between Israel and Palestine. Arafat, the leader of the PLO became a sort of “Israeli policeman,” and the Oslo accords began to unravel. The existence of a group like Hamas from the onset coupled with the lengthy duration of the Oslo process was almost a set up for failure.

Another example from Bunton’s chapter outlines how the second intifada wreaked havoc on the region and almost nullified any short term hopes for an agreement between both parties. Hostilities were pent up from Israeli occupation, and as a result the visit in September 2000 by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the Dome of the Rock with the message that any Jew could visit the site unleashed a wave of protests from Palestinians. Ultimately, 18 Palestinians were killed, and by 2003, 2400 Palestinians and 800 Israeli lives were claimed in addition to those who were wounded. As a security measure, Sharon deployed Israeli military might in the form of fighter-jets and helicopters and wreaked colossal “human suffering.” Sharon was able to greatly reduce Arafat’s power, and belittle the PLO into a hollow organization reflecting nothing more than a name. The violence led to a significant chain of events that would ultimately lead to the construction of a wall in Israel that was coupled with the expansion of settlements beyond the lines of the 1967 border agreement. Arafat died shortly after and was replaced by Mahmoud Abbas, who was brushed aside by the growing power of Hamas who won over power in a democratic election. Abbas would eventually set up a separate emergency government distinct from Hamas. The example outlined by Bunton above goes to show the atrocities committed by both sides and the rising dissent that gave way towards immense hostilities that put the hope of an agreement to the side.

Bunton’s chapter clearly articulates both perspectives of the issue, articulating where the Israel and Palestinian governments went wrong. Without injecting a personal opinion, he distinctly outlines how Palestine is like a power vacuum between the PLO and Hamas. Both sides seem stuck in their ways, while Israel holds almost all the leverage and Palestinians lack much to give. The rise of Hamas in the region and the use of suicide bombings and terrorism further complicates the situation. In turn, Israel seems to continually elect Prime Ministers who are less keen on compromise and more in favor of keeping faith with what they deem in the best interests of a singular Jewish state, rather than a two state solution. International actors seem to not have all too much significance in helping the situation. Despite the Clinton Administrations orchestration of a potential agreement, both sides end up resorting back to some form of hostility. Despite the tension in the region, it seems like time is the only key to finding a solution, regardless of the outcome at the end of the Oslo process. In order for a successful two state solution to occur Israel needs to elect a government that will negotiate in good faith, while the Palestinians need a more uniform democracy that is not led by a group such as Hamas or a dictator. The one critique of Bunton’s chapter highlights how he aims to show the “depth of Palestinian nationalism,” but never mentions the word nationalism in the rest of the reading. Despite not doing so, he does illustrate through his story telling of events the breadth of Palestinian nationalism and the opposition it has raised towards Israel.

C) Analysis: Module 5, Module 6, Module 8

The Israeli Palestinian conflict has wreaked havoc in the Middle East for decades, and conveyed the tensions of two different peoples to the international stage. The Oslo Accord meetings in 2001 brought the Palestinian’s and Israeli’s the closest to ever reaching an agreement than they had possibly ever been before. Despite the hostility and turmoil between both parties, a two state solution is possible in the long-term under the same model and rational as the Oslo Accords were constructed. Roger D. Peterson, in his book, Understanding Ethnic Violence Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth- Century Eastern Europe, articulates a theory as to how emotions play an essential role in triggering matters of ethnic violence and discrimination. His theory as to “why individual human beings commit acts, sometimes brutal and humiliating acts, against other individual human beings of a different ethnic category,” plays a critical role in understanding how emotions set in motion the Second Intifada, which halted peace talks, as well as gave rise to religious extremist groups such as Hamas, who’ve complicated the goal of a peaceful two state solution.

Charles D. Smith, in his book, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, outlines two examples of how Israel worked to undermine Palestinian legitimacy, which play into the idea of emotions causing massive human suffering. Ariel Sharon, who served as the Minister of agriculture in Israel, seemed to always oppose any sort of deal that legitimized Palestine. Sharon believed in the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and deemed Arabs living in the West Bank as “alien to a Jewish state.” He had close ties with the Jewish National Fund, and was able to implement a policy that allowed for the seizure of over 500,000 acres of property. If Arab land owners could not prove ownership of their land, the government deemed the property could be turned over to Jewish settlers. Such a policy was able to rid the territory of many Arabs.

Furthermore, after Begin won election in 1981 and appointed Sharon as the minister of defense, the two worked to derail Palestinian hostility by “implementing their own version of Palestinian autonomy.” They abolished the military government in the West Bank, and installed civilian administration headquartered in Israel. The officials filled the body were people who they could essentially own and could command what to do. The move was opposed by Palestinians, however Israeli chief of staff Rafael Eitan developed an “iron fist” policy encouraging violence towards Arab citizens in the West Bank.

Such actions by the Israeli government who had all the control and leverage in the territory only stirred resentment amongst Palestinians. The PLO may have had militant aspects and caused animosity in the region, but many of the civil Palestinians were groped into the larger conflict and lost land they owned and faced discrimination as a result of settlements. Such actions acted as a way of shaping identity in the conflict. The notion of Israeli’s and Palestinians as having separate and hostile identities only mounted more. In addition, such actions would build up emotions that would lead to the First and Second Intifadas. The structural change in the region of the West Bank in particular combined with the growing feelings of animosity would act as a catalyst and basis point for future tensions.

Martin Bunton, in his book, The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, outlines in chapter six “the rise and fall of the peace process between 1987 and 2007.” Due to growing nerves in the early 1980’s, Bunton outlines how Arafat – the chairman of the PLO for most of its existence until his death in 2004 – was able to capitalize on a developing new political scenery in the region. The First Intifada gave rise to the terrorist group Hamas, who derived its roots from the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas rejected a lot of the moves by the PLO and Arafat and the Fatah, and began to work towards the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic State. As a result, Hamas engaged in suicide bombings meant to kill Israeli civilians. Emotions were high during this period as evident through the expanding settlements in the 1980’s, and Peterson’s argument concerning emotions highlights how they can provoke individuals into committing acts of atrocities as a means to an end.

Bunton illustrates how the Oslo framework was not meant to find an immediate solution to the conflict, but to rather develop and cultivate a lasting relationship that could lead to a peaceful solution. In his first example, Bunton explains how Israeli occupation grew worse during the Oslo process, as the number of Israeli’s living settlements increased from 250,000 to nearly 400,000. Palestinian society was also splintered as bypass roads were built linking settlements. Such actions only stirred emotions.

The final tipping point Bunton articulates concerns then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque in 2000– where the first and second Jewish temple were located – and how all Jewish people were entitled to visit the site. His actions provoked protests the next day, which resulted in the death of eighteen Palestinians. More violence would break out, and give rise to the Second Intifada, otherwise known as the al-Aqsa intifada. Both groups had been very close to reaching an agreement through the Oslo Accords, but the pent up anger over Israeli occupation spurred too many emotions amongst Palestinians and led to violence. No leader was necessary for the uprising to occur, the Palestinians were already humiliated and tired of Israel leverage of the dilemma and their continuous expansion in the West Bank. The Palestinians united as a mob and emboldened groups such as Hamas to continue committing heinous terrorist acts such as suicide bombings.

In the 2006 democratic PLO election Hamas stunningly won power, provoking Mahmoud Abbas to call an emergency cabinet meeting and set up a separate government independent of Hamas. The results of the election point towards Palestinians frustration with the negotiation process with Israel, and only transpire more emotions that result into violence. Meir Litvak outlines in his paper, the Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas, how the Israeli hostility towards Palestine is a result of the prophet Muhammad’s victory over Jewish tribes at Medina. Litvak further explains how Ibrahim Quqa – one of the founders of Hamas – said, “God has gathered the Jews in Palestine, not in order that it would be a home and land for them, but to serve as their graveyard, so that he would free the whole world from this pest. Just as pilgrims atone for their sins by offering a sacrifice in Mecca, so would the Jews be sacrificed in al-Aqsa (mosque) by hands pure as those of the Pilgrims.” Furthermore, the Hamas Covenant of 1988 outlines in the very beginning, “Israel will exist and continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated other before it.”

From the perspectives of the Israeli’s, the rhetoric from Hamas, who acts as a governing body in Palestine is very concerning. It only makes sense that more conservative leaders with a platform of security keep winning elections in Israel. Such manner of speech from Hamas only spurs Israeli emotions, resulting in the Jewish state to conduct military operations and expand their control in the territory through settlements. Just like the Israeli’s have provoked Palestinian emotions, the Palestinians have done the same by electing Hamas to power and allowing them to gain more influence in the region.

Ultimately, in order for peace to be reached and a two-state solution to occur, administrations that work to not provoke the emotions of the other side must be in place. Similar to the Oslo Accords process, such administrations need to build rapport overtime and not provoke the emotions of the other side. As illustrated via Petersons theory for emotions, the two Intifadas and other events such as the expansion of settlements highlight how emotions can become all-consuming and dominant. Both sides isolate each other and create opposing and hostile identifies, and pent up anger has almost always culminated in sparking spontaneous and directed violence. In order for peace to be, which is possible, both sides must work to eradicate provoking the emotions of the other side to the point of violence.

Outside Sources

Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Palestine Liberation Organization.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 17 Nov. 2013, www.britannica.com/topic/Palestine-Liberation-Organization.

History.com Editors. “PLO.” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 7 May 2018, www.history.com/topics/middle-east/plo.

Laub, Zachery. “Hamas.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 Aug. 2014, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hamas.

“Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).” Anti-Defamation League, www.adl.org/resources/glossary-terms/palestine-liberation-organization-plo.

“Palestine Liberation Organization.” State of Palestine Mission to the United Nations, palestineun.org/about-palestine/palestine-liberation-organization/.

Snitkoff, Ed. “Gush Emunim.” My Jewish Learning, My Jewish Learning, www.myjewishlearning.com/article/gush-emunim/.